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CoNSnTtITIONAL LAw-CENSORSHIP oF OBSCENE LITERATURE-

The right to a free expression of ideas, without interference from
governmental authorities, is inherent in the very nature of a democracy.1 On the other hand, it is also clear that the greater interests
of the state at large will conflict with certain forms of expression, and
in such circumstances obviously the former must prevail. It is the
purpose of this comment to discuss the constitutional limitations on the
governmental suppression of literature on grounds of obscenity.2

1 ". • • But when men have realized that time has upset many lighting faiths, they
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market; and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried
out. •••" Justice Holmes, dissenting in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 at 630,
40 S.Ct. 17 (1919).
2 Although it is conceded that governmental powei:s to limit expression are not conlined solely to obscene literature, this comment will consider only the latter.
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I. The Common Law Heritage
The problem of requiring literary publications to conform to
certain basic moral standards is not a modem one. Originally, the
English common law courts imposed no criminal sanctions on the
publication and distribution of obscene or lewd material.:~ Although
disturbed by their inability to meet the situation, the early judges
ruled against any criminal liability, on the ground that no adequate
precedent could be found.4 It was pointed out that this was not
properly a problem for the temporal courts, but rather for the ecclesiastical courts, which in their great concern with spiritual matters
must necessarily possess power to punish obscenity. However, it became increasingly evident that either the ecclesiastical courts had no
jurisdiction over the matter, were not exercising it, or were doing so
quite ineffectively. For it was not too long after the issue had first
been presented to the English court" that it reversed itself. In Rex -v.
Curl,6 the Court of the King's Bench ruled that the publication of
obscene matter was an offense against the Crown and must necessarily be punishable in the common law courts. Thus was established
the crime of obscene libel, which Blackstone in his Commentaries7
later recognized as a part of the common law of England.8 That this
common law criminal liability was carried over to the United States
and still exists today seems clear,9 although for all practical purposes
actions are now prosecuted in pursuance of appropriate statut~.10 It
has never been contended that the protections of the First:11 and
Fourteenth12 Amendments to the United States Constitution served
to abolish these common law sanctions in this country.13

.
3Regina v. Read, Fort. 98, 92 Eng. Rep. 777 (1707).
4Jn Regina v. Read, Fort. 98, 92 Eng. Rep. 777 (1707), it was argued that Le Roy
v. Sir Charles Sedley, 1 Sid. 168, 82 Eng. Rep. 1036 (1663), :Iepresented authority for
punishment of overt obscenity, but the court concluded that this decision :Iested on criminal
assault and battery.
"Regina v. Read, Fort. 98, 92 Eng. Rep. 777 (1707).
62 Strange 788, 93 Eng. Rep. 849 (1727).
7BucxST., CoMM., book IV, pp. 150-153.
s See generally 2 W.HAP..TON, C=mrAL LA.w, 12th ed., §§1942-1946 (1932).
9 Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2 S. & R. (Pa.) 91 (1815); Commonwealth v. Holmes,
17 Mass. 336 (1821); State. v. Appling, 25 Mo. 315 (1857).
10 See note 14 infra.
11 "Congress shall make no law :Iespecting an establishment of :Ieligion, or prohibiting
the free e.xercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a :Iedress of griev~
ances." U.S. CoNsr., amend. I.
12 " ••• nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law••••" U.S. CoNsr., amend. XIV.
13 See 2 Coor.BY, CoNsTrrUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 8th ed., 883 (1927).
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II. Under Modern Statutes
Any fruitful consideration of effective restraint on obscene literature today must take into account prevalent state statutes and municipal ordinances. These form the basis for all attempts at suppression
of morally undesirable publications. Forty-seven of our states have
statutes imposing criminal liability for the publication or distribution
of obscene matter.14 New Mexico, the one state having no provision
for the punishment of obscene publications, expressly empowers the
municipalities to impose criminal sanctions.16 Even where state criminal provisions exist, it is common to find an overlapping enforcement,
due to the presence of local ordinances.16
A. Constitutionality of Provisions. The initial inquiry must be
whether these statutory provisions run afoul of First Amendment
protections of free speech, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
against infringement by the state.1 7 The concern here is not with
the question of the validity of prior restraints on expression.18 This
latter phase of the constitutional problem raised by these statutory
14AJa. Code (1940) tit. 14, §373; .Arlz. Code Ann. (1939) c. 43, §3002; Ark. Stat.
Ann. (1947) §41-2704; Cal. Penal Code (1949) §311; Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935) c. 48,
§217; Conn. Gen. Stat. (1949) §8567; Del. Code Ann. (1953) tit. 11, §711; Fla. Stat.
Ann. (1944) §847.01; Ga. Code Ann. (1935) tit. 26, §6301; Idaho Code (1948) §18-4101;
Ill. Rev. Stat. (1935) c. 38, §468; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums, 1933) c. 28, §§10-2804, 102805; Iowa Code Ann. (1950) tit. 35, §725.4; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (1949) c. 21,
§§1101, 1102; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1953) §436.100; La. Rev. Stat. (1950) tit. 14, §106; Me.
Rev. Stat. (1944) c. 121, §24; Md. Code Ann. (1951) art. 27, §515; Mass. Laws Ann.
(1952 Supp.) c. 272, §28 (§28C provides for proceedings against the book itself in order
to determine obscenity); Mich. Stat. Ann. (1938) §28.575; Minn. Stat. Ann. (1947)
§617.24; Miss. Code Ann. (1942) tit. 11, §2288; Mo. Stat. Ann. (1953) §563.280;
Mont. Rev. Code (1947) tit. 94, §3603; Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943) c. 28, §921; Nev. Comp.
Laws (1929) §10144; N.H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 441, §§14, 17; N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937)
§2:140-2; 39 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1944) §1141; N.C. Gen. Stat. (1953)
c. 14, §189; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) tit. 12, §2109; Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1953)
§2905.34; Okla. Stat. Ann. (1937) tit. 21, §1021; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) §23-924;
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1945) tit. 18, §4524; R.I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. 610, §13; S.C.
Code (1952) tit. 16, §414; S.D. Code (1939) tit. 13, §1722; Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams,
1934) §11190; Tex. Penal Code Ann. (Vernon, 1952) art. 526; Utah Code Ann. (1953)
tit. 76, c. 39, §1; Vt. Stat. (1947) tit. 41, c. 370, §8490; Va. Code (1950) tit. 18, §113;
Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) tit. 14, c. 6, §2459; W.Va. Code (1949)
§6066; Wis. Stat. (1951) §351.38; Wyo. Comp. Stat. (1945) §9-513~
lU N.M. Stat. Ann. (1941) c. 14, §1812.
16 See, e.g., Municipal Code 0£ Chicago (1929) §192-9; Municipal Code, City 0£
Detroit (1945) c. 185, §1; The Pittsburgh Municipal Digest (1938) §733.
17 In ensuing portions 0£ this comment, references will be made to First Amendment
protections. It should be noted that where state or local action is considered, these protections are referred to as they are mirrored by the due process clause 0£ the Fourteenth
Amendment.
ts Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625 (1931). But see 49 CoL. L. REv.
1001 (1949).
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provisions will be considered later.19 Yet it must be recognized that
the protection accorded by the First Amendment is more than a mere
limitation on prior restraint. From a practical standpoint, in fact,
. the more significant safeguard is the establishment of limits beyond
which the states may not even impose subsequent punishment for
expression. However, it seems to be conceded that obscene utterances
are not within this area of privileged expression.20 If the matter truly
qualifies as obscenity, the First Amendment will not preclude state
or local punishment.
Like all criminal statutory provisions, obscenity statutes and ordinances must conform to the constitutional requirement .of lucidity. .
If the provision is too vague to apprise potential violators of the nature
of the prohibited action, the Fourteenth Amendment will invalidate
it as a denial of due process. Although it might be thought that
statutes or ordinances imposing criminal sanctions on obscenity are
peculiarly subject to such attack, the Supreme Court has never ruled
that such provisions are not sufficiently clear.21 It would probably be
concluded that the common law crime of obscene libel22 has laid a
sufficiently clear foundation for the validity of the statutory crime.28

B. Application of Provisions. The application of the obscenity
laws to specific cases has, by and large, resulted in no clear line of
authority as to what will qualify as "obscene."24 Although the uncertain application of these statutory provisions bears a theoretical relationship to the constitutional question of whether the provisions are void

part 11-C of this comment, infra.
20 "••• There are certain well-denned and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any constitutional
problem. These mclude the lewd and obscene, the profane, the h"'belous, and the insulting
or 'lighting' words-those which by their very utterance inffict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace." Chaplmsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 at 571, 62
S.Ct. 766 (1942). See also New York v. Doubleday, 297 N.Y. 687, 77 N.E. (2d) 6
(1947), affd. per curiam, 335 U.S. 848, 69 S.Ct. 79 (1948).
21Dunlop v. United States, 165 U.S. 486, 17 S.Ct. 375 (1897); Winters v. New
York, 333 U.S. 507, 68 S.Ct. 665 (1948); New York v. Doubleday, 297 N.Y. 687, 77
N.E. (2d) 6 (1947), affd. per curiam, 335 U.S. 848, 69 S.Ct. 79 (1948).
22 See treatment of common law liability in part I of this comment.
23 ''The impossibility of denning the precise line between permissible uncertamty in
statutes caused by describing crimes by words well understood through long use in the
criminal law-obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent or disgusting-and the unconstitutional vagueness that leaves a person uncertam as to the kind of prolnoited conductmassmg stories to incite crime-has resulted in three arguments of this case in this Court. •••"
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 at 518, 68 S. Ct. 665 (1947).
24 See Alpert, "Judicial Censorship of Obscene Literature," 52 HAnv. L. REv. 40
(1938). See also the opinion in Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa. D. & C. 101 (1949).
10 See
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for vagueness,25 the courts in resolving the latter question in favor of
the validity of the provisions would not likely be bothered by the
inconsistencies in the varying tests utilized in the application of the
penal sanctions.
The earliest test of obscenity was enunciated in the celebrated
opinion in Regina 11. Hicklin.26 There, Chief Justice Cockburn stated
that the test of obscenity is " ... whether the tendency of the matter
charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those w~ose minds are
open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication
of this sort may fall."21 Although lip service has apparently been paid
to this standard in the United States,28 other decisions have indicated
a preference for a narrower definition.29 It has been pointed out
that a test of obscenity as broad as that formulated by Justice Cockburn would include many of the classics, since certain passages might
serve to corrupt the mind of the pervert, which is seemingly the standard that the test imposes.30 As a further departure from the early
English doctrine, there has developed a line of cases concluding that
books or pamphlets the purpose of which is to further sex education
are not "obscene."31 This latter development perhaps paved the way
for the famous "Ulysses" decision.32 In the federal district court
opinion in that case, Judge Woolsey concluded that in order to qualify
as "obscene" a publication must be "dirt for dirt's sake."33 This doctrine
would leave outside the sphere of punishable matter any work representing a laudable purpose on the part of the author, regardless of

2G This is treated in part II-A of this comment.
2a L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868).
2'l'Regina v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 at 371 (1868).
2s United States v. Bennett, (2d Cir. 1879) 16 Blatchf. 338; Rosen v. United States,
161 U.S. 29, 16 S.Ct. 434 (1896). See also 81 A.L.R. 801 (1932).
29 St. Hubert Guild v. Quinn, 64 Misc. 336, 118 N.Y.S. 582 (1909); Halsey v. The
New York Society for the Suppression of Vice, 234 N.Y. 1, 136 N.E. 219 (1922); United
States v. Dennett, (2d Cir. 1930) 39 F. (2d) 564; United States v. One Book Entitled
"Contraception," (D.C. N.Y. 1931) 51 F. (2d) 525.
ao See generally, Em.ST AND SBAcLE, To nm PtIIIB ••• (1929); ERNST AND l.nmBY,
Tim CENsoa MARmms ON (1940).
a1 United States v. Dennett, (2d Cir. 1930) 39 F. (2d) 564; United States v. One
Obscene Book Entitled "Married Love," (D.C. N.Y. 1931) 48 F. (2d) 821; United States
v. One Book Entitled "Contraception," (D.C. N.Y. 1931) 51 F. (2d) 525. See also 76
A.L.R. 1099 (1932).
3 2 United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," (D.C. N.Y. 1933) 5 F. Supp. 182,
affd. (2d Cir. 1934) 72 F. (2d) 705.
33 " • • • In many places it seems to me to be disgusting, but although it contains, as
I have mentioned above, many words usually considered dirty, I have not found anything
that I consider to be dirt for dirt's sake. ..." United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses,"
(D.C. N.Y. 1933) 5 F. Supp. 182 at 184, affd. (2d Cir. 1934) 72 F. (2d) 705.
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his medium of expression. Such a test of obscenity certainiy represents
a significant departure from the test first formulated by Justice Cockburn. In any event, it has received support in recent years.34
C. Constitutionality of Enforcement Methods. Probably the most
significant constitutional question raised by statutory provisions imposing criminal sanctions on the publication or distribution of obscene
literature relates to the methods utilized in the enforcement of these
provisions. Certainly the proper state or local authorities are empowered to initiate prosecutions for alleged violations of these obscenity
laws, and no meritorious question can be raised as to the constitutionality of such action. Common law civil actions of course remain
as a limitation on the abuse of such processes.35 However, serious
questions arise from a consideration of action taken by officers before
prosecution, with restraint of embryonic violation as its purpose.
In a recent federal district court case, New American Library of
World Literature 11. Allen,36 the enforcement officer3' sent to the local
distributors of a large publishing house lists of those books which he
considered violative of a municipal ordinance imposing criminal sanctions on the distribution and sale of obscene literature. This action
amounted to a threat of prosecution, the purpose of which was to
remove the questionable books from the publisher's outlet in that

S4 United States v. Levine, (2d. Cir. 1936) 83 F. (2d) 156; Walker v. Popenoe, (D.C.
Cir. 1945) 149 F. (2d) 511. Although only a few courts will go so far as to sustain a
publication on the sole ground that it is written with a sincere purpose, others have been
influenced by the "Ulysses" decision in decreeing a standard more liberal than that 0£ the
earlier cases. See Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N.E. (2d) 840 (1945);
People v. Wepplo, 78 Cal. App. (2d) 959, 178 P. (2d) 853 (1947); Commonwealth v.
Gordon, 66 Pa. D. & C. 101 (1949) (extensive discussion 0£ the history 0£ the application
0£ obscenity provisions), affd. 166 Pa. SUPer. 120, 70 A. (2d) 389 (1950). See also
ERNST AND l.mDEY, THE CENSOR MARCHES ON 20-24 (1940); Alpert, "Judicial Censorship 0£ Obscene Literature," 52 HAnv. L. REv. 40 (1938), where the author suggests that
the difficulties which application 0£ the obscenity laws engender might best be obviated by
the elimination 0£ all criminal sanctions against "obscene literature."
35 Halsey v. The New York Society for the Suppression 0£ Vice, 234 N.Y. 1, 136
N.E. 219 (1922).
as (D.C. Ohio 1953) 114 F. Supp. 823.
87 In American ,Mercury v. Chase, (D.C. Mass. 1926) 13 F. (2d) 224, the court
enjoined the Boston Watch and Ward Society from threatening the plaintiff magazine with
prosecution i£ they did not suppress certain publications which that organization deemed
morally undesirable. In reaching its decision, the court treated the Society as an unofficial
organization, and the decision has been noted on that basis. 75 Umv. P.A. L. REv. 258
(1926); 25 MICH. L. REv. 74 (1926). But the question under consideration here might
have been reached i£ it had been impressed upon the court that a closer scrutiny 0£ that
Society's function would show it to be, in effect, an agent 0£ municipal authorities. See
CHAP:EE, THE !NQOIRING MmD 136-140 (1928).
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municipality. After deciding that the ordinance in question was constitutional, the court concluded that the circulation of the lists was
outside the statutory authority of the officer in question.38 As a result,
the publishing house was granted an injunction restraining the local
officer from pursuing this means of intimidation. It would seem that
this interpretation is quite narrow- especially in light of the common
practices of governmental authorities in the enforcement of criminal
provisions in general. Certainly it is a rare, and perhaps inefficient,
penal officer who is not well-informed on potential criminal violations,
and who at the same time does not seek to restrain their commission
through personal contact with the potential violator. Yet such a narrow
determination of the powers of the officer enforcing obscenity laws
can probably be explained by the courts' justifiable reluctance to give
sanction to anything that might appear to be, or even form the basis
for, a prior restraint on expression. Here is reached the crux of the
problem of censorship of obscene literature.
The determination that it is not within the enforcement powers of
governmental officers to threaten prosecution of distributors who continue to handle stipulated literary works of course obviates consideration of any constitutional question relating to freedom of expression.
But if it were determined that such action on the part of these officers
is authorized, the question immediately becomes paramount, is this
a prior restraint on expression? And if so, is it a denial of due process,
forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment?
At the outset, it would seem that the circulation of such lists by
penal officers does not constitute on its face a restraint on expression.
The publishers or distributors may or may not conform to these lists.
A failure to do so will bring about no results other than those which
would follow were no lists distributed, viz., prosecution under the
appropriate obscenity provision. Yet it seems reasonably clear that a
distribution of such lists has an effect independent of that provided by
a later prosecution. Relatively small distributors might suppress certain literary works for fear of prosecution, and this fear would be all
the more aggravated when the authorities have indicated the certainty
of a criminal proceeding in the event of non-compliance with the
distributed lists.39 To say that such a power, were it to fall into the
3 8 For a like determination on an identical issue, see Bantam Books v. Melko, 25 N.J.
Super. 292, 96 A. (2d) 47 (1953). The court there went on to point out that the action
by the officer also constituted an unconstitutional fonn of censorship.
39 See CHAPEE, F.REB SPEECH m 'I'B:E UNITBD SrATES 536-540 (1941).
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hands of those who might abuse it, would be a dangerous one is to
voice the obvious. It is therefore submitted that the power to circulate
such lists, as a mode of enforcement of the obscenity laws, does in
effect constitute a prior restraint.40
The final question which must be considered is whether or not
a previous restraint on obscene publications is rendered invalid by the
Fourteenth Amendment, as it incorporates ~e. First Amendment.41
The doctrine that although the First Amendment does not preclude
punishment for some forms of eJ>,.'Pression it does operate to limit the
power of the states and municipalities to impose prior restraints on
expression finds its most famous pronouncement in the case of Near 11.
Minnesota.42 In that case, however, the Supreme Court did suggest
two possible situations where a valid prior restraint might exist. These
the Court referred to when it said: "The objection has also been made
that the principle as to immunity from previous restraint is stated too
broadly, if every such restraint is deemed to be prohibited. That is
undoubtedly true; the protection even as to previous restraint is not
absolutely unlimited . . . . On similar grounds, the primary requirements of decency may be enforced against obscene publications ...."43
The Court seems to have meant that a prior restraint is permissible
when the expression would constitute a "clear and present danger."
The Court has never since been called upon to determine if a prior
restraint on obscenity is valid.44 That it might follow this casual
remark in Near 11. Minnesota is possible. But it would seem that before
the Court would sanction prior censorship of obscene literature, it
would demand extremely definite standards for determining what
would constitute obscenity-a requirement which appears quite difficult
to meet.45
Donald M. Wilkinson, Jr., S.Ed.
40lbid.
41 See

Bantam Books v. Melko, 25 N.J. Super. 292, 96 A. (2d) 47 (1953).
42283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625 (1931).
43 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 at 715, 51 S.Ct. 625 (1931). The fust possibility
the Court recognized was that expression which. would have an adverse effect on the
security of the nation could be restrained by the government during time of war.
44 In striking down a municipal ordinance which made a license a prerequisite to the
distribution of literature, the Court noted: " ••• The ordinance is not limited to 'literature'
that is obscene or offensive to public morals or that advocates UDlawful conduct. • • ."
Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 at 451, 58 S.Ct. 666 (1937). But see Bantam
Books v. Melko, 25 N.J. Super. 292, 96 A. (2d) 47 (1953); Cs:A.PEB, Frum SPEECH IN
TRa UNm!D STATES 536-540 (1941).
45 See CRAP.tm, Frum SPEECH IN nm UNIT.BD STATES 536-540 (1941).

